PoC — DNS zone takeover

Security research · reported to MTN Group via HackerOne

This page is served by an external security researcher on:

mtnfinancialservices.com mtninsure.com

Root cause Both zones are delegated at the .com registry to ns1.hostmax.me and ns2.hostmax.me. The domain hostmax.me was unregistered and available to anyone until 2026-09-29. Registering it grants full control of both DNS zones — with no access to MTN infrastructure.
DemonstratedArbitrary hostnames created in both zones, resolving worldwide
MailRefused — null MX (MX 0 ., RFC 7505)
Public certificatesBlocked — CAA 0 issue ";"
This certificateSelf-signed — no publicly-trusted CA, no CT log entry
LoggingDisabled — no visitor data recorded, DNS or HTTP
Mail readNone. No MTN system accessed.
To MTN Group hostmax.me is held defensively so nobody else can take it. It is yours on request, at no cost and with no conditions — reply on the HackerOne report and it will be transferred, or removed, immediately.

Verify independently:
dig +norec +noall +authority NS mtnfinancialservices.com @a.gtld-servers.net
dig +short MX mtnfinancialservices.com  → must return 0 .
whois hostmax.me  → creation date 2026-09-29